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ABSTRACT 
 
Social Entrepreneurship causes increasing debate in the literature and represents a 
growing enigma for theories of the firm. Beyond the divergences in its definitions, we show 
that its mission to create “social value” is an identifiable common feature that cannot be 
satisfactorily described within the main existing theories. 
Indeed, social entrepreneurship is, by definition, inconsistent with the shareholder 
primacy advocating for the too narrow only objective of shareholder profit maximization. But 
it departs also from stakeholder views that focus on the survival of the firm by aligning its 
interests with discrepant and “overbroad” crucial stakeholders. Outwardly oriented missions 
in fact necessitate forgetting the dominant “principal-agent”-like settings, even if principals 
might be carefully and rightfully chosen. 
We support our arguments with the study of two empirical cases that are successful 
long-lasting businesses related to social entrepreneurship: John Lewis Partnership and Equal 
Exchange. These companies have built pioneering custom-made governance systems – 
ensuring both performance and social fairness – that dispense with standard implicit 
hypotheses: their clearly explicit mission identifies “beneficiaries” that are distinct from 
crucial stakeholders, financial contributors, and principals. Instead, the mission becomes a 
pivotal attribute to explain and design these organisations’ structure and mechanisms. 
Consequently, we delineate three main theoretical and managerial implications of 
revealing this mission: it lends a strong legitimacy to the directors and officers by clearly 
defining the boundaries of their discretion, it specifies and justifies the participants’ 
engagement in the management authority, and it calls for new control mechanisms that are 
fundamentally different from the monitoring systems of principal-agent relationships. Thus 
our model clarifies the firms’ boundaries and escapes the traditional stakeholders’ conflicts of 
interest. 
We postulate that this model opens an interesting field for future research, both on 
social and conventional entrepreneurship, and may entail a deep change in managerial and 
governance techniques that may have reached a dead-end in the recent economic crisis. 
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Introduction 
 
« There is […] much for conventional, institutional, and cultural entrepreneurship 
researchers to learn from the social entrepreneurship context. » (Dacin et al. 2010) 
 
Dacin, Dacin & Matear have argued that Social Entrepreneurship does not require a new 
specific theory to be fully described (P. A. Dacin et al. 2010). According to them, it is a 
“context in which established entrepreneurs operate” and existing theories apply, although 
with some differences that may be of interest for researchers in “conventional” fields. 
On the contrary, we contend that the main existing theories cannot satisfactorily account 
for social entrepreneurship, which succeeds in escaping the usual theoretical dilemma 
between too narrow and “overbroad” conceptions of directors duties towards specific or 
underspecified groups of stakeholders. We postulate that the dominant “principal-agent”-like 
settings that are supported by the literature must be relinquished to describe the social 
enterprises’ organizations. Thus, our paper investigates two contrasted empirical cases related 
to the social entrepreneurship field to identify the most convincing explanatory factor of these 
peculiar organization structures. 
 
By reframing a long and still hot debate, Dacin et al. highlight the lack of a convergent 
definition of what is “social entrepreneurship”. Indeed, numerous different concepts may 
define a social enterprise depending on who is their creator (Plerhoples 2012). It may describe 
business that address directly social needs through their products, “blended enterprises” 
(Reiser 2010) that make considered choices between profit and social good to sustain 
“double” or “triple bottom line”, or business that seek to simultaneously promote the two 
through a “blended-value” (Emerson 2003). 
Yet, beyond these different definitions, Dacin et al. note that “the notion of providing 
social value or some derivative of social value appears to be a common theme across the 
majority of social entrepreneurship definitions” (P. A. Dacin et al. 2010). This common 
theme may be qualified as the “mission” or the “purpose” of the enterprise. 
Should this purpose be comprehensive (i.e. addressing all possible “social benefit” 
criteria from the environment to the society, including governance choices and internal 
stakeholders)(Munch 2012; Reiser 2011) or specific to a peculiar cause (Plerhoples 2012), it 
appears to be a specific characteristic for each social enterprise that must be designed and 
operational. 
In this paper, our purpose is to challenge the conventional framework by assessing the 
explanatory and designing power of this mission. We contend that Social Enterprises exhibit a 
pivotal attribute that is overlooked by the existing theories but should be integrated in a 
meaningful theory of the firm. In turn, we intend to show that it enables reconsidering the 
traditional roles of corporate governance, legitimating a broader and “mission-controlled” 
discretion for management, redefining the participants’ engagement and building a collective 
by creating solidarity rules. Finally, we suggest that this attribute may also be of great 
theoretical interest in conventional fields and that further research may be needed to reassess 
the purpose of the firm. 
 
1. Can we really account for Social Entrepreneurship within the existing theories? 
 1.1 Social Entrepreneurship defies the shareholder primacy 
Since the seminal paper by Jensen & Meckling (1976), agency theory is the dominant 
frame to analyse the firm in the literature (Dalton et al. 2007). Using the mathematical 
description of the “principal-agent problem”, the agency theory advocates for mechanisms 
that control the discretion of the management to avoid opportunistic behaviour that may divert 
resources and reduce the performance of the firm. Shareholders being depicted as taking the 
most risks among the participants in the firm because of their position of “residual claimants”, 
they would then be the most legitimate to control the managers to ensure the efficiency of 
their decisions. 
As Donaldson has recently demonstrated (Donaldson 2012), this analysis prepares the 
ground for an implicitly normative argument about what should be the purpose of the firm. 
From ensuring the “performance” of the firm, the “shareholder primacy norm” shifts to a 
novel objective: the shareholder profit maximisation (Lazonick & O’Sullivan 2000). 
Extensive criticism of this exclusive shareholder value as the “corporate objective 
function” (Jensen 2001) has been written, notably to contradict Friedman’s thesis that this 
objective is the only social responsibility of the corporation (Friedman 1970). 
 
Throughout the different definitions of Social Entrepreneurship (Plerhoples 2012; P. A. 
Dacin et al. 2010; Katz & Page 2010; Mendell 2010), we can highlight two fundamental 
common features. First, the social enterprise must provide social value as a necessary purpose 
of either its actions or its products. Second, this social value, whether taking precedent on, 
competing with or going together with profit, is not “profit” itself and must be explicitly 
distinguished from profit. 
On the opposite, the agency theory associated with shareholder primacy recommends that 
no other goal than shareholder profit maximization be considered, what makes it 
inappropriate by definition to qualify social entrepreneurship. It suggests that the purpose of 
the whole corporation (and specifically of its managers) emerges from the specific state 
(residual claimancy) of a single class of its participants, determined by the specificity of their 
contribution. This creates obviously no consensus among even the narrowest pool of actors 
involved in the firm’s activity, since the shareholders themselves have competing interests 
(Hoskisson et al. 2002; Carney et al. 2011). In fact, it automatically precludes all other 
participants than shareholders (including managers) to have a say in their enterprise’s ultimate 
purpose. 
Social enterprises give good examples to argue that not all firms have the same mission, 
and that it is a deliberate and collective choice to make that will constrain the firm’s strategy. 
The agency theory implicitly makes one believe that shareholder profit maximisation is the 
only objective to be conceivable for both legitimacy and efficiency. Numerous papers since 
Blair & Stout (1999) have shown that the “residual claimancy” argument is fallacious (e.g. 
Lan & Heracleous 2010; Asher et al. 2005), and that a broader set of relevant “stakeholders” 
shall be considered, not to say take an active part, in the definition of this purpose, either on 
legitimacy or efficiency grounds (see infra §1.2). 
Finally, the agency theory, by directly equating this purpose to the shareholders interests, 
advocates for a direct control of the managers by the shareholders in person (as principals), 
thus creating a short-circuit between the corporation and the shareholders (Blair & Stout 
1999). This contributes to hide the normative shift leading to designate the shareholders as the 
legitimate ultimate beneficiaries of the whole firm. Social Entrepreneurship, on the contrary, 
needs to separate the firm’s interest from the interests of its shareholders, as social value must 
a minima be provided to a greater circle than the one of the financial investors. In turn, the 
“shareholder primacy” version of agency theory is too narrow to account for social 
entrepreneurship because it reduces the purpose of the firm to the single financial interest of 
one restrictive group of principals. 
 
1.2 Social Entrepreneurship escapes from the pitfall of “aggregate welfare”  
The stakeholder view has been popularized by Freeman (1984) as an alternate conception 
of the firm. Its core proposal is to consider a broader set of participants in the firm for each 
management decision, what should a priori provide a better frame to account for the Social 
Enterprise’s bet to provide social value beyond the frontiers of the corporation. 
Yet, the first formulation by Freeman of the purpose to include external stakeholders in 
the scope of the strategic management of the firm was to prevent any internal or external 
action to be harmful to the firm, having considered a “turbulent environment”. In this way, 
Freeman acknowledges the organization’s objective as being its own survival (R. E. Freeman 
& McVea 2001). 
From this strategic point of view it becomes of the utmost importance to identify what are 
the different stakeholders so that managers be able to anticipate and “balance” their interests. 
Varied definitions have thus been taken to contain what should be the relevant stakeholders 
for the firm. Donaldson & Preston (1995) identify several competing definitions: "those 
groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist" according to the SRI 
(quoted p.72), "anything influencing or influenced by" the firm in Freeman’s view (quoted 
p.86), “people who have a stake in the business” for Kotter & Heskett (quoted p.71). But 
according to the authors, "stakeholders are identified by their interests in the corporation, 
whether the corporation has any corresponding functional interest in them" (emphasis in 
original). Further work has since contributed to arrive at the better delimitation of the 
stakeholders according to the firm’s context and governance (Mitchell et al. 1997; Fassin 
2009; Carney et al. 2011; Post et al. 2002). 
Assuming the suitable definition of stakeholders to be accepted, "the very purpose of the 
firm is […] to serve as a vehicle for coordinating interests" (T. Donaldson & Preston 1995). 
Indeed, it is a permanent feature of the stakeholder view (confirmed by Post et al. 2002) that 
the main objective of managers is to “balance” the interests of all the identified participants: 
“stakeholder management is a never-ending task of balancing and integrating multiple 
relationships and multiple objectives” (R. E. Freeman & McVea 2001). 
This entails that the very mission of the firm is entirely defined by the list of “salient” 
stakeholders that have their own competing objectives. And the salience of these stakeholders 
depends on their own attributes rather than on the firm’s own strategy (Mitchell et al. 1997) 
and is differently defined depending on the different authors. Consequently, critics have 
pointed out that this list is at best “vague” and idiosyncratic (Orts & Strudler 2010). 
Moreover, these de facto stakeholders may form an overly broad area of concern for the firm 
thus leading to an intractable “aggregate welfare” obligation, namely to carefully weight the 
interests of a potentially endless list of people that might be “influenced” by the firm. 
From the Social Entrepreneurship viewpoint, we add that it makes of the identification of 
a coherent social purpose an impossible task. Orts & Strudler remark that none of the papers 
on stakeholder view would argue that stakeholders’ interests could always be made to align, 
hence the commitment to a never-ending “balancing without objectives”. In fact, it should be 
noted that every stakeholder model that has been drawn since Freeman (R. E. Freeman 1984; 
R. Freeman et al. 2007; Post et al. 2002; Fassin 2009) represents the firm as a black box and 
assume its pre-existence to identify the stakeholders. This precludes the theory of identifying 
any means to determine an appropriate purpose of the firm beyond those of each stakeholder 
involved. Therefore, in such a system managers would “have no way to make principled or 
purposeful decisions” (Jensen 2001, emphasis added). 
Building on these arguments, the collective design of a social purpose that would be 
different from those of all the stakeholders involved is forcefully ruled out. The “Extended 
Enterprise” model (Post et al. 2002) incidentally makes it clear that core stakeholders are 
those from the “resource base”, thus ruling out the possibility to run the firm primarily 
towards an external purpose. Furthermore, managing a social enterprise that may clearly 
favour one group of stakeholders over the others should prove intractable if all stakeholders 
are given an equal right of bargaining (Donaldson & Preston 1995 quoting Evan & Freeman). 
If the legitimate and operational aspects of the stakeholder view are questionable for the 
“conventional” firm, and have indeed be extensively questioned (e.g. Jensen 2001; Orts & 
Strudler 2010; Carney et al. 2011; Reynolds et al. 2006), we contend that they also do not 
satisfactorily apply to the Social Enterprise. 
 
1.3 Social Entrepreneurship challenges the legitimacy of internal stakeholders’ control  
Research has been successful in developing formal theories that may support the 
stakeholder view (Grandori 2005), such as the Team Production Theory (Blair & Stout 1999) 
or a revisited form of the Property Rights Theory (Asher et al. 2005). Heracleous & Lan 
(2012), building on the landmark paper of Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, insist on the broad 
discretion that is granted to the directors by corporate law that generally presupposes their 
competence to run the business. As “Mediating Hierarchs” mandated by the corporation, they 
would not be agents of a particular group of stakeholders but of the corporation itself. 
However, in accordance with the stakeholder view, they admit that ensuring the long-lasting 
firm-specific investment of the crucial stakeholders impose a “prioritization” role for 
managers that would prevent them to pursue a mission that does not distributes equally 
satisficing returns (Lan & Heracleous 2010; Heracleous & Lan 2012). Although providing a 
mechanism that should at least prove “socially responsible” regarding internal stakeholders 
(notably employees), they provide instrumental and normative arguments (Donaldson & 
Preston 1995) that seem to impose a one best way, similarly to the agency theory, and to 
prevent from conceiving a social purpose diverging from the interests of the core 
stakeholders.  
The Property Rights approach (Asher et al. 2005), bringing back the work by Hart, 
Grossman and Moore in the same way, provides new arguments to build a form of 
stakeholder-agency theory (Hill & Jones 1992) in which relevant stakeholders (identified by 
the incompletion of their contracts due to the specificity of their investment) would be the 
principals instead of the shareholders. Here the preceding arguments about the competing 
interests balancing objective and the direct control of managers in agency theory remain 
valid: though extending the circle of potential beneficiaries to other internal stakeholders, this 
conception cannot satisfactorily account for a social enterprise choosing an outwardly 
oriented mission. 
In fact, although the general stakeholder view could be flawed by the “overbreadth” (Orts 
& Strudler 2010) of the discretion left to the managers in considering the varied potential 
stakeholders of the firm, formal “stakeholder theories” fail to account for social 
entrepreneurship because they reintroduce some forms of principal-agent relationships 
between “invested” stakeholders becoming rightful principals and directors that cannot design 
a purpose that is not aligned with these new principals’ interests. 
 
1.4 Theoretical outcomes 
At this stage, it appears that theoretical constructions of the firm assume an implicit 
mission that should be deduced from its context and is constrained by the necessary 
participants of the firm (either shareholder primacy or stakeholder balancing). Social 
entrepreneurs would then not have room of manoeuvre to invent and design a principled 
social mission to their enterprise, since privileging a particular (especially externally oriented) 
purpose over the crucial stakeholders should prove inefficient and jeopardize the firm’s 
survival. Moreover, as directors are in turn always described as agents of some of these 
rightful stakeholders becoming new species of principals, they should be directly monitored 
by these people, what the “mission” is certainly not able to do by itself. Recent work does not 
reappraise this conclusion but find new arguments that may constrain or logically imply the 
definition of a firm’s behaviour, which may be related to the personal values and ideologies of 
the managers (Adams et al. 2011), to the structure of authority due to the mode of governance 
of the firm (Carney et al. 2011), or to the influence of the institutional context that may 
redefine the “principal-agent” relations (Wiseman et al. 2012). 
 
2. Research Questions & Methodology 
Our research questions stem from this inadequacy of main theories to account for a 
peculiar attribute that is revealed by the Social Entrepreneurship literature: how to explain the 
specificity of social entrepreneurship vis-à-vis standard theories and is this “mission” a 
convincing factor? How does the mission help understand the specificities of the governance 
of the social enterprises? What could be its implications for both theory and practical 
management? 
To support our research on these questions, we have chosen two contrasted empirical 
cases that are related to Social Entrepreneurship. Our methodology lies at the crossroads 
between i) the “pursuing failure” methodology (Gray & Cooper 2009) through the specific 
choice of counterexamples that cannot be theorized within existing theories, and ii) the case 
study research (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Yin 2009; Siggelkow 2007) and inductive theory 
building (Eisenhardt 1989) in that we use these cases to reveal some interesting attributes that 
may be of interest for new theoretical outcomes. 
Accordingly to this literature, our counterexamples are contrasted and offer original 
forms for governance that supersede existing models, while being performing, long-lasting 
and viable firms with workable structures in the current legal framework (which incidentally 
appears to be rather plastic and permissive). We also use these cases to shed light on the 
shortcomings between competing theories, and to specify some boundaries to their legitimate 
domain. 
As Siggelkow has argued, we are thus not looking for the representativeness of our cases 
but we believe that they are of strong inspirational power for a more general theory beyond 
their specificities. In this respect, we propose a “free-standing” model (Siggelkow 2007) 
drawn from our observations and advocate for further research to refine its potential 
descriptive and predictive power and its own legitimate domain. 
Besides, as we are mainly using publicly available information and existing literature to 
ground our discussion, the new attributes we bring from these cases to base our proposal still 
need to see their potential confirmed and put to the test through more representative empirical 
cases, and the development of further research in this direction. 
 
3. Empirical Data 
We rely on two empirical cases that may be related to the social entrepreneurship sector: 
John Lewis Partnership, a UK actor of the retail sector, and Equal Exchange, a US-based 
cooperative acting in Fair Trade. 
 
3.1 John Lewis Partnership 
John Lewis Partnership (JLP) is a private group operating John Lewis department stores 
and Waitrose supermarkets in Great Britain. The first store being founded by John Lewis in 
1864, it is one of the oldest enterprises to operate in the retail sector in the UK. By the year 
2012, the group had a revenue of £8.7 billion, and more than 80,000 employees. Its sales’ 
growth and operating profit margin are comparable to those of its competitors on the UK 
market (Tesco, Asda, Sainbury’s, Morrissons), a few of them having additional international 
branches with different performance. However, John Lewis Partnership has no external 
shareholders, and redistributes its profit to the employees, in the form of an annual bonus 
amounting to 10 to 20% of the annual pay. 
It is worth noting that John Lewis Partnership is not a partnership in the legal sense. It is 
composed of mainly 4 companies, John Lewis Partnership PLC, John Lewis PLC, Waitrose 
ltd. and John Lewis Partnership Trust ltd. The firm is called “partnership” following its 
founder’s wish. 
The partnership’s shares are entirely owned by the Trust, for the benefit of the 
partnership’s “past, current and prospective employees” (Bradley et al. 1990), who are to be 
called “partners”, following the trust settlement of 1950 (Lewis 1954). Although this is a 
common feature of what is called “employee-owned” firms, notably in the US with Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), it remains fundamental to observe that partners (employees) 
do not own shares (the Trust is the sole shareholder), and that this Trust was, as a legal 
person, designed in the first place. 
Namely, it is the partnership founder, John Spedan Lewis, who designed it in 1950. Five 
persons are directors of the Trust, among who three are elected partners, and the Deputy 
Chairman of JLP. The Trust is designed so that its Chairman and last director be John Lewis 
Partnership’s Chairman itself, thus preventing the Trust as a shareholder to go against the 
Partnership’s board decision. 
 Second notable feature, the firm’s objectives and principles are “enshrined in a 
constitution”, which dictates the governance structure of the firm (power, income and 
knowledge sharing). According to the constitution, although being legally the only 
shareholder, the Trust has no management power beyond i) the role of watching to the 
“constitutionality” of management decisions, ii) the definition of constituencies for partners to 
vote, and iii) the power to accede to the partners wish to remove the Chairman in extreme 
situations. 
So far, this shareholder of a unique kind has thus no voting right, and does not earn 
dividends, which are yielded to the partners in the form of the annual bonus. 
 
It would seem obvious at that point that the voting rights are also yielded to the partners 
to balance the abnormal discretion latitude of the chairman. Yet, in opposition to conventional 
employee-owned firms or co-operatives, partners are not entitled to elect the partnership’s 
board, nor their Chairman. The Chairman designates its own successor, and half of the board 
of the John Lewis Partnership PLC. It is really the true locus of the management, combining 
the roles of CEO and Chairman (Bradley et al. 1990). The management has very large room 
of manoeuvre in both accomplishing day-to-day actions and determining long-term strategies. 
Instead, the partners vote for a “Partnership Council” which is of course not a legal 
attribute of the PLC. The council is responsible for representing the partners’ interests (taken 
as a community, instead of individual interests). In general meetings, it elects, in turn, the 
other half of the PLC board, as well as the three trustees. This council, acting close to a 
legislature to the executive (Bradley et al. 1990) has constitutionally the power to ask the 
Chairman to account for its decisions and to “make recommendations” regarding its strategy.  
Finally, the partnership council is able to ask the trustees to remove the Chairman if the 
latter fails to justify the constitutionality of its decisions. Although this removal power 
justifies, in the view of Bradley et al., the fact that employees ultimately control the 
partnership, we can observe that this removal strongly depends on the criteria that make a 
management decision “constitutional”. The main criteria to assess the constitutionality of a 
decision are enclosed in the “principles” section of the constitution, the first and main article 
of it being: “The Partnership’s ultimate purpose is the happiness of all its members, through 
their worthwhile and satisfying employment in a successful business”1 (emphasis added). 
Consequently, it is through its legal obligation to hold the shares for the benefit of the 
partners that the three elected trustees may use their director power to remove the chairman of 
the Trust ltd, thus removing the chairman of the Partnership (same person). This, in turn, 
appears to be the only possible way to effectively control the executive. 
 
3.2 Equal Exchange 
Equal Exchange was founded in 1986, in the context of a political crisis leading to an 
embargo on the import of coffee from Nicaragua. From the very beginning, the founders 
chose to design their firm according to their own moral and political principles. On the one 
hand, they built their enterprise to fight against the inequalities in the global system of coffee 
trade (and food trade in general) – which often leads to prices much too low for acceptable 
working and living conditions of the farmers (producers) – and, in their own terms2, to offer 
fairness and empowerment to farmers and consumers. They were among the first American 
firms to adopt the Fair Trade chart that has initially been written in Europe. 
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On the other hand they chose the co-operative form based on the two principles that 
frame the co-op status: workers shall hold the majority of the voting rights, and these rights 
shall be distributed so that each person gets one vote. 
Equal Exchange today employ more than 100 people, and had over $35 million sales in 
2011. Their primary activity is coffee roasting although they have diversified in other Fair 
Trade activities, such as sugar or fruit. 
Its governance structure is typical of a co-operative. Every worker is required to buy 
exactly one share (around $2,500 thanks to a 4-year no-interest loan offered by the firm) that 
gives a voting right. “Worker-owners” elect the 9 members of the Board of Directors, three of 
them are “outside members” (i.e. not workers). The directors then hire two workers to be 
Executive Directors, who are in charge of the management and the recruitment of other 
workers. When workers decide to leave the co-op, or are dismissed, they must sell back their 
share to the firm and are refunded at the purchase price. Equal Exchange’s articles of 
incorporation also require that the ratio between the higher and lower pay (per hour) must not 
exceed 4 to 1. 
 
Equal Exchange is an interesting case because of its financing structure. Indeed, its 
activities and social choices require high working capital, for example because they want to 
grant the poorest farmers the possibility to invest in their means of production before having 
the coffee to deliver. This means investing substantially in a risky cultivation, months before 
getting the raw material that base their roasting activity. Equal Exchange thus provides 
practical innovations to solve a common hurdle met by the co-operatives: attracting external 
investors. 
Its capital is divided in two types of stock, “class A common shares” that are voting 
shares exclusively held by the workers, and “class B preferred stock”, which are sold to 
external investors. Class A shares give right to “patronage rebates” that are not correlated to 
their nominal or present value, but to the profit of each year. The by-laws require that the 
rebate should amount to 40% of the net profit or loss, after state income taxes and preferred 
stock dividend payments, but before charitable donations and federal income taxes. At least 
20% of the rebates shall be paid in cash to the workers, the rest being added to individual 
accounts that increase the (variable) capital of Equal Exchange and may be used to cover 
losses in case of a negative result.   
As noted, Class B stock give only right to dividends. They are “targeted” at 5% of their 
purchase price ($27,50 in 2011) but are not guaranteed. Indeed, the board has the discretion to 
set this rate every year, although it has for now always met the target. This preferred stock is 
not transferable and gives no voting right. It is redeemed by the co-operative after 5 years at 
the selling price, or at lower price after 3 or 4 years. However, these shares are “preferred”, 
which means their dividends are paid before the patronage rebates and thus do not support the 
primary financial risk. Over the few past years, we observe that the amount paid in dividends 
for preferred stock is comparable to the total rebate paid to the workers, what gives this 
insurance a real interest. 
This financing structure is deemed to be a success, as 96% of the capital is made up 
preferred non-voting stock, amounting to $9,1 million in 2011 against about $300,000 of class 
A shares. Yet, the workers own 100% of the voting rights. Investors, on the other hand, have 
benefited from a 5% rate over the fifteen past years, which is a much better result than that of 
an amount equally invested in the US S&P 500. 
Practical innovations also include the first ever issued firm-specific Certificates of 
Deposit, according to Equal Exchange. Class B stock is granted to a small number of chosen 
external and mainly institutional investors, and extending the system to the general public 
without a specific market would be too costly. Equal Exchange thus entered into an 
agreement with a bank (Eastern Bank as of 2012) to create a certificate of deposit that is 
specific to the enterprise. Instead of standard interest-bearing time deposits that the bank may 
use for its own operations, which may maximize the return while spreading the risks, these 
firm-specific deposits make the money exclusively available to Equal Exchange through a 
low-cost line of credit. Customers that choose this type of deposit benefit from a guaranteed 
interest rate over the time before withdrawal, but may still be considered as “investors” since 
they bear the bankruptcy risk as a standard lender would. Indeed, while the bank is FDIC 
insured for its own potential insolvency, it has not to refund its customers if Equal Exchange 
cannot repay its debts. It is worth noting though that the firm must repay these deposits as 
standard debt before considering paying out dividends, even for preferred stock. 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Deconstructing the implicit hypotheses of the theories and revealing a new attribute 
 
Business beneficiaries are not crucial stakeholders or contributors 
John Lewis partnership and Equal Exchange seem to fall within the teratology domain, 
when analysed from the conventional theories of the firm. 
For example, following the stakeholder frame that we established earlier, the firm 
ultimate purpose should be its survival, which is utterly dependent on the balanced 
satisfaction of the competing interests of the relevant stakeholders. The first step to describe 
the firm’s organization would then be to identify the list of relevant stakeholders (Post et al. 
2002 p.23). 
Ruling out shareholders, the “Resource Base” of JLP includes employees, lenders and 
customers (according to Post, Preston & Sachs). From the “Industry Structure”, relationships 
to suppliers, and regulatory authorities can be identified; from the outer “Social Political 
Arena” mainly local communities, and recently the UK government, are linked. This 
shareholder view has an undeniable descriptive power, as JLP is recognised to lead particular 
politics towards each group of these stakeholders, which are identified in the constitution. 
However, this constitution acknowledges that the “ultimate purpose” of the partnership is 
entirely directed towards employees, somewhat leading to consider all the other stakeholders 
as being minor, or “secondary” (Mitchell et al. 1997), including crucial ones such as 
customers, clients or suppliers. And yet, employees are not given the direct right to control the 
management decisions, but only to “make recommendations”, which would seem to be a 
rather weak bargaining power to prevent managers from behaving opportunistically. 
Furthermore, according to Post et al. the next step is to “specify the goals to be achieved 
in each stakeholder relationship”, so that the firm may ensure its survival. To that end, 
traditional relationships with employees include efficiency and commitment, with customers, 
satisfaction and best value, with suppliers, loyalty and cooperation, with lenders, trust and 
responsibility, with regulatory authorities and government, compliance, and with local 
communities, fairness and assistance. Yet, JLP’s constitution claims to primarily pursue the 
happiness of its employees, without any condition on their efficiency, and even subordinates 
the condition of the business success to that ultimate aim. 
Equal Exchange’s governance leads to a similar enigma: their acknowledged purpose is 
to help the farmers, who seem not to be given any bargaining right, but somehow justify to 
put the firm deliberately at risk and to ask its investors to engage their money for 5 years 
without even guaranteeing their return or giving them voting rights. 
Thus, we observe that a new class of  “stakeholders” is emerging that we may call 
“beneficiaries”, who are directly concerned by the purpose of the firm and benefit from either 
its activities or its outcome. These cases show that beneficiaries are not to be confused with 
crucial or primary stakeholders, contrary to the claim of the stakeholder view, and with 
financial contributors, as would claim the shareholder primacy norm. 
Beneficiaries are not principals 
Theorization by Asher, Mahoney & Mahoney (2005), would have led to a more 
prescriptive governance system. The incomplete contracts theory in the case of the John 
Lewis Partnership presumably leads to only consider employees, assuming that lenders only 
commit in complete contracts (no specific investment necessary). Therefore the most 
foreseeable organisation form would be a co-operative organization in which employees are 
principals and managers are agents. Managers would then be directly constrained by 
employees to pursue their own benefit. The Team Production Theory would probably lead to 
the same results, considering that directors would owe fiduciary duties towards the 
corporation, which is almost exclusively made up of employees, and would then be mediating 
hierarchs between employees and… other employees. 
These organization forms are traditionally bundled in the “employee-owned”, “worker-
owners” or “employee-shareholders” designations. Interestingly, this is a common short-
circuit used to describe JLP. Yet, as we have seen, the reality of the relationships between 
directors, managers and employees is far more complex. In particular, quasi-autonomous 
management and the additional democratic representative system are not constitutive of the 
co-operative forms. Moreover, the prerogative, granted to the partners, to remove the 
chairman is entirely dependant on a failure to follow the partnership’s constitution, and is 
quite different from the possibility usually granted to the shareholders to remove them 
without cause. 
Likewise, Equal Exchange’s cooperative form is predictable (although investors here are 
asked to strengthen their engagement through long-term and non-guaranteed results) but 
would be unable to explain its Fair Trade mission, i.e. why the beneficiaries of the firm’s 
activities are not primarily the workers themselves. 
 
Revealing a pivotal attribute: the mission 
In fact, we demonstrate that all conventional governance theories equally presuppose that 
management decisions must be controlled by a specific group of stakeholders, either because 
of the risk of opportunistic behaviour, or to ensure better performance. 
The Agency Theory with shareholder primacy norm merges the three roles of capital 
contributors or holders, revenue beneficiaries and voting rights holders. It suggests two types 
of reasons to make of these shareholders the legitimate principals to control the directors-
agents: the instrumental argument that being residual claimants they are best placed to ensure 
the firm efficiency, and the normative argument that being “owners of the corporation” (in 
fact of its shares), they have the legitimacy to be the principals. 
The stakeholder view urges managers to identify new types of contributors (e.g. through 
specific investment) that must become beneficiaries of the firm and in turn largely constrain 
the management discretion, either because of the instrumental argument that taking critical 
stakeholders into account will boost the firm’s performance or the normative argument that 
people who have stakes in the enterprise must legitimately be considered. 
Finally, these theories always consider different forms of contracts between some 
“principals” (shareholders, stakeholders or the corporation itself in the case of the Team 
Production Theory) that may impose their interests and directors that are mandated and must 
then be monitored. Therefore, they ensure that this “mandate” aligns the firm’s purpose with 
the interests of the “principals”, thus invariably focusing the debate on who should be the 
rightful “principals”. Hence the numerous debates on ownership versus control, stakeholder 
salience, shareholder primacy and the “true” legal prescription. Interestingly, the Team 
Production theory insists on the broad discretion that is offered by law to the directors as 
agents of the corporation (relationship that is materialized through the fiduciary duties). 
However, ensuring the long-lasting engagement of participants that bring firm-specific 
investments still requires a “prioritization” between the different stakeholders and perhaps 
also the monopolizing of surplus by the shareholders, which remain the only participants to 
nominate the directors (Heracleous & Lan 2012 p.232). 
These cases open a different path, by establishing a purpose to the firm that is not drawn 
from the list of the salient stakeholders and does not assume a pre-existing power structure. 
For example, John Lewis Partnership’s constitution clearly enacts the partnership’s mission: 
“the happiness of all its members, through their worthwhile and satisfying employment in a 
successful business”. 
 
The mission is not a “principal” 
Bradley et al. have equated this mission to the maximisation of the present value of the 
Trust, therefore to the maximisation of JLP’s profit (Bradley et al. 1990 p.389). By doing this, 
they make two implicit hypotheses: that the purpose of a firm is inevitably of financial nature, 
and that partners are implicit principals, who can impose their interests because of their 
alleged removal power. We argue that making this mission explicit has a much broader 
meaning. 
On the one hand, the purpose as expressed in the constitution entails much more than the 
simple short or long-term profit. “Worthwhile and satisfying employment” easily call for 
numerous criteria: working conditions, wages pensions and other advantages, management 
attention, training and employability, career, health, diversity and attractiveness of jobs, 
working atmosphere, satisfying relationships to customers etc. These can of course be thought 
as relevant “performance” criteria, but also serve as guidelines for management in their 
diversification, growth, and employment strategies as well as for day-to-day actions in stores. 
On the other hand, instead of trying to balance the interests of primary stakeholders in a 
fuzzy manner, the mission may directly be used to monitor the sharing of power, which is the 
role of the trustees that ensure fair elections, define constituencies and control the 
‘constitutionality’ of decisions; but also the sharing of income, which is the ground for the 
annual bonus redistributed to every partner according to their pay and may amount to 20% of 
it; and the sharing of knowledge, principle that is at the origin of a wide network of 
representation through branch forums, registrars, counsellors and meetings, “backed by an 
extensive system of company journalism” (Bradley et al. 1990). 
More precisely, we contend that designing an explicit mission has three major 
consequences on the management of the organisation: it lends a strong legitimacy to the 
directors and officers by clearly defining the boundaries of their discretion, it identifies the 
relevant stakeholders by defining their engagement, it calls for new control mechanisms that 
are fundamentally different from the monitoring systems of principal-agent relationships. 
 
4.2 Theoretical and managerial implications of designing a mission 
 
a) Strong legitimacy and clear demarcation of the management discretion 
By ensuring the constitutionality of management decisions, the existence of the purpose 
lends a strong legitimacy to the Chairman and its hierarchy structure. This, in turn, makes the 
case for a wider discretion for managers, and justifies their empowerment through their 
competences rather than through a stakeholders’ direct representative system, which has 
greater chance to bring conflicts. Their legitimacy is ensured i) by the ability handed over the 
partners to dismiss the Chairman if he/she is not able to demonstrate the positive impact of a 
decision on the happiness of the members (which is precisely the mission), ii) by the 
adjoining a democratic system of representation that does not directly constrain the managers 
but hold them to account, and iii) by the legal obligation of the Trust, single shareholder, to 
hold the shares for the benefit of the partners. 
The use of a Trust is not very innovative in itself, since it is a common technique used to 
allow employees to “own” stock without changing the basic rules of the standard corporation. 
Theoretically speaking, however, it is an interesting way to differentiate the different 
“functions” of shares, as dividends (“revenue” function of stock) are handed over the 
employees while voting rights (“control” function of stock) are kept “safe” from them, thanks 
to the design of the Trust – legal person – itself, which may be controlled by the corporation. 
“Benefit” would here be taken as the mere financial outcome of stock, somewhat restraining 
the legal obligation to its simplest conception. 
The montage for JLP goes one step further as the Trust gives in both functions, thus 
being a peculiar kind of shareholders that would be deprived of both dividends and voting 
rights. In fact, the technique ensures the pursuit of the partnership’s purpose – the happiness 
of its members – by making of the legal obligation of the Trust – holding shares for the 
benefit of the partners – an effective way to hold the chairman accountable: as the single 
shareholder, the Trust has the legal power to remove the chairman if doing so would benefit 
to the partners. 
Thus, shareholders, revenue beneficiaries, and voting rights holders may very well be 
three different groups of people. In addition, John Lewis Partnership’s governance redefines 
what are the voting rights themselves: they are not a means to elect the corporation’s board 
anymore, which previously designated its chairman and top executives, but a means to 
constitute a kind of legislative assembly (Bradley et al. 1990) that defines the frame within 
which the executives may act, and holds them accountable. 
This structure departs clearly from the conventional theories and would be 
incomprehensible without exhibiting both the constitution and its mission. Indeed, we observe 
that there is no principal anymore, as voting rights have been redefined to shape the 
conditions within which directors and managers have their own legitimacy. Consequently, the 
mission becomes the only possible way to effectively control the executive through the 
ultimate sanction of dismissal, hence the existence of the Trust, a shareholder devoid of 
voting and surplus rights. 
Therefore, the mission-centric management enables a decoupling between the different 
governance roles (capital contributor, principal, voter, revenue beneficiary, etc.), which can 
be recombined in the very interest of that mission without prejudging their legitimate 
distribution. We contend that the mission is then explicitly the only normative argument that 
must guide the design of the collective organization. 
 
b) Emergence of a theory of engagement and solidarity 
Thus, the design of a purpose reverses the management process as detailed by the 
stakeholder view. According to this view, which assumes the pre-existence of the firm, 
managers have to identify the list of salient stakeholders, and to deduce constraints in order to 
take their relationship into account, without determining any guiding objective. The design of 
purpose, on the contrary, is of corporate interest and must be decided to “define” the 
enterprise scope of action and underlying strategy. 
This purpose naturally identifies the “salient” stakeholders thanks to a self-supporting 
principle: the mission gathers the people that accept to “work” for it, or at least to curb their 
own interests in its direction. This prerequisite mechanically entails the collective aspect of 
the design, and a new definition of stakeholders as being the people that a) are designated 
beneficiaries or necessary contributors to the mission, and b) accept to hand over the 
enterprise authority (namely its management structure) a part of their own action and decision 
power (Segrestin & Hatchuel 2011). 
This has two fundamental consequences. First, it erases the impossibility to define a 
mission that is not directly aligned with the interests of all stakeholders by reversing the 
dependence link, what enables social entrepreneurs to promote an outwardly oriented social 
mission. Second, it gives a new definition of the stakeholders’ engagement, what clarifies the 
firm’s boundaries and enables targeted collective rules (such as solidarity rules). 
 
Equal Exchange, for example, clearly exhibits an externally oriented mission: to offer 
fairness and empowerment to farmers and consumers. This mission, as for John Lewis 
Partnership, implies a large list of criteria that may go far beyond fair purchase money for 
farmers and selling price for consumers. We have already mentioned the early investment for 
the poorest farmers to develop their production capacities, what requires high working capital 
for Equal Exchange. 
Consequently, we identify a few groups of stakeholders that match our new description: 
beneficiaries or necessary contributors that recognise the enterprise authority on part of their 
decisions. Workers who roast the coffee to produce saleable beverage ingredients; and 
investors that participate to Equal Exchange’s necessary equity and put their money at risk. 
From this list, we exclude a priori farmers and consumers that do not need to place 
themselves under the firm’s authority (except those, including local communities, who engage 
in a socio-political action that may be coordinated by Equal Exchange), and conventional 
creditors who guarantee their autonomy vis-à-vis the firm by diversifying their portfolios and 
being within the first to be refunded in case of a liquidation. 
As we have seen, making a mission explicit may allow the participants to reconsider the 
roles allocated by the standard governance rules. Within our “mission-centric” framework, 
three different questions are raised: i) how are the identified stakeholders engaged and how do 
they create solidarity? ii) who must be the beneficiaries? iii) how are management decisions 
controlled against the mission? 
As the mission states, the main beneficiaries are the farmers. However a mutual choice 
lead to limit their engagement in the collective project: they only commit themselves to 
supply food when they receive Equal Exchange’s investment. Should they strongly depend on 
the firm’s mission (as their only potential Fair Trade buyer) or not, they do not hand their 
acting power over the firm’s authority beyond this contract. For example, Equal Exchange 
cannot have a voice about the manner the farmers may choose to grow their production. Thus, 
on the contrary to the stakeholder basic assumption, beneficiaries are not primary 
stakeholders or “engaged” participants. The firm’s mission is not confused with the workers’ 
interests. It is not confused with the contributors and investors’ interests either: it has been 
defined as the corporation’s purpose before considering the “salience” of its stakeholders. 
On the other hand, these “necessary” stakeholders must strongly engage in the firm’s 
mission. Workers, of course, which are under the authority of the executives, stake their 
career, training and employability, purchase an expensive share etc., thus clearly binding their 
outcome to the firm’s success. But investors are committed too: they are offered a choice 
regarding their level of commitment between the class B preferred stock and the Certificate of 
Deposit, the latter being a “debt” with guaranteed return over three years, and the former 
being 5-year non-voting stock with dividends “targeted” at 5%. 
Equal Exchange thus look beyond the mere financial contribution (amount and time) to 
determine the solidarity between the “duty-bound” participants. Against the primary 
assumption of the shareholder-centric governance, the enterprise offers a higher return to 
workers although they only contribute for 4% of the total capital. In fact, they are guaranteed 
two types of financial outcome: wages that are still paid first, and rebates that exceed 100% of 
their share value, but are paid last, leading them to be a new type of “residual claimants” that 
echo their high engagement instead of justifying it. It enables the “only” financial investors to 
avoid this critical position, thus bearing a limited risk that suits their different kind of 
commitment, and eliminates the need for liquid assets. Instead, both securities (preferred 
stock and certificate of deposit) mention the mission as the main reason for setting their 
minimal term; even justifying that $2500 for 3 years is the appropriate investment for a 5- or 
6-person family investing in coffee production. 
 
c) Renewal of the notion of “control” through mission-centric mechanisms 
It also eliminates a third argument of the shareholder primacy tenants: that the residual 
claim should enable voting rights for financial investors. 
We tackle here the third question: how would management decisions be controlled 
against the common mission? As John Lewis Partnership demonstrates, it is possible to leave 
a broad discretion to managers, and to relinquish the “principal-agent” model that should 
align the management decisions to the interests of some rightful stakeholders. Instead, 
management legitimacy is ensured by its subordination to a mission that circumscribes its 
field of possibilities. Thus, the decisions and strategies of the chairman and its management 
team are systematically reviewed against the “ultimate purpose” of the partnership. 
This entails two governance characteristics: a guaranteed transparency, which is obtained 
here through the numerous meetings of the partnership council with the chairman and the 
independent internal journalism system; along with a specific body, whose function is 
precisely to assess the management performance against this mission. In this case, the trustees 
are in charge of assessing the “constitutionality” of the strategy, and of arbitrating in case of a 
conflict. 
Here again, those who are responsible of controlling the management against its mission 
are not those who benefit from the firm’s activities, those who contribute to the resource base 
of the firm, or those who are the most engaged in the firm, on the contrary to a co-operative 
form. We can even imagine that this role could be handed over disinterested third parties as 
would enable a standard assessing the mission3. 
Furthermore, directors and officers taking decisions shall not consider every stakeholder 
anymore. Rather than an impossible “catch-all” or “fuzzy” norm that would require balancing 
all the competing interests before each decision, the mission-centric view allows managers to 
focus on a particular direction, which may of course very well be different from maximizing 
profits. 
Several hypotheses can be put forth to determine what mechanisms may guarantee this 
control, gathering legitimacy and solidarity requirements. John Lewis Partnership is endowed 
with a constitution that clearly defines the controlling parameter, and uses the legal obligation 
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of the Trust to ensure the legitimacy of the control. Equal Exchange relies on several charters, 
including mainly the Fair Trade charter that was imported from Europe. 
Besides, Equal Exchange’s cooperative form, although not directly deriving from their 
primary mission, comes from an explicit choice of the founders to place workers at the centre 
of their decision-making structure, as a symbol of their wish to reverse the food trade system 
that privileges prices (and thus finance) over the farmers’ condition. Beyond this personal 
choice, we still observe that those who control the mission are not the main identified 
beneficiaries themselves or the main financial contributors. 
 
We think it is of interest for further research to identify the mechanisms that may ensure 
the legitimacy of the mission control, as well as the particular attributes of the fiduciary duties 
to the corporation that may emerge when the firm is bound to an explicit purpose rather than 
to a specific group of stakeholders. In this way, we believe that the study of innovative law 
provisions that amend the corporations code in several states of the US (and especially the 
Flexible Purpose Corporation in California) will be of great contribution. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Describing Social Enterprises as theoretical “Hybrid forms” between conventional for-
profit and non-for-profit organisations is largely insufficient to capture the specific features of 
this field and reveals the shortcomings of the standard theories of the firm. Contrary to some 
authors’ view, we argue that while Social Entrepreneurship may teach a lot about the existing 
theories, its peculiar and otherwise unpredictable features actually require a new theoretical 
framework to be understood. We propose to build on the most recognised of these features, 
namely the existence of the mission to create a social value that is disconnected from pure 
shareholder profit.  
The mission-centric approach of the firm has implications far beyond social 
entrepreneurship, though. It gives some insights for enriching conventional views of the firm. 
Traditional academic debates are still struggling with competing arguments about the rightful 
stakeholders to be given control rights and social or financial benefits. Moving definitions of 
the firm that follow imply fuzzy and intractable purposes based on instrumental and implicit 
normative claims, although numerous studies (as Donaldson & Preston already highlighted in 
1995) have shown a mitigated impact of choosing between these different conceptions. We 
postulate that a novel framework based on the mission might not only better describe the 
social entrepreneurship field, but also complement the conventional theories faced to 
increasing enigmas in the firms’ behaviour and success. 
Theoretically, we believe that changing the fundamental tenet of the corporate 
governance – namely a form of mandate, or due control, between some “principals-to-be” and 
the corporation’s directors – to study the conditions and consequences of the design of a 
collective or common purpose may open a vast field of research both in social and 
conventional entrepreneurship. 
It also opens a new path to practically design organisations, and has broad managerial 
implications, since traditional governance “tools” (such as boards with numerous committees, 
incentives, monitoring or stakeholder participation systems) are encountering some practical 
and theoretical limits. They may be complemented by mechanisms that ensure the enactment 
and the respect of a common mission (such as Trusts, constitutions, charters etc.) and of 
solidarity rules between the different constituencies of the firm (such as long-term 
investments, profit and knowledge sharing, legislative assemblies, etc.). In this respect, it is 
worthwhile noticing that new corporate law in the US has introduced new statutes for 
companies: not surprisingly, the obligation to formulate and explicit the mission or  “purpose” 
is the core element of these statutes, for instance the benefit corporation and the flexible 
purpose corporation. 
Further research may thus address these cases and questions along with the global 
redesigning movement in corporate law, tackling two forgotten questions of contemporary 
theories: the purpose of the firm and the role of its management. 
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